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Commercial Transportation
by Madeline E. McNeeley*
Yvonne S. Godfrey"
Andrew J. Conn*
and Stephen G. Lowry*
I. INTRODUCTION

Commercial transportation involves all of the significant forms of
passenger and property transportation across the United States. This
Article covers four major areas: (1) trucking and commercial transit; (2)
aviation; (3) limousines, taxis, and rideshare services; and (4) railroads.'
Most of these areas are subject to heavy federal regulation due to their
involvement in and effect on interstate commerce. This Article surveys

*Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Tennessee (B.A. & B.S., magna cum laude, 1999); University of Maryland,
College Park (M.S., 2001); University of Tennessee College of Law (J.D., summa cum laude,
2008). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
"Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
Rhodes College (B.A., cum laude, 2003); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum
laude, 2011). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
"*Associate in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.B.A., 2011); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude,
2014). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
-- Partner in the firm of Harris Lowry Manton LLP, Atlanta and Savannah, Georgia.
University of Maryland Baltimore County (B.A., magna cum laude, 1995); Lewis and Clark
College Northwestern School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1998). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. A fifth major issue in commercial transportation, the development of autonomous
vehicles (or self-driving cars), is being regulated primarily at the state level at present, to
the extent it is regulated at all. Therefore, there are no significant developments to report
in this survey of Eleventh Circuit law. The reader should be aware that as autonomous
vehicles come ever closer to reality, they are expected to have important effects across all
ground-based commercial transportation. For more on how the state of Georgia is beginning
to regulate autonomous vehicles see Stephen G. Lowry, Madeline E. McNeeley, Kristy S.
Davies & Yvonne S. Godfrey, Commercial Transportation,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
69 MERCER L. REV. 41, 56-57 (2017).
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significant judicial, regulatory, and legislative developments in Eleventh
Circuit commercial transportation law during the period from January 1,
2016 through December 31, 2017.2
II. TRUCKING AND COMMERCIAL TRANSIT
The United States Department of Transportation's Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) was established on January 1,
2000,3 to regulate commercial motor vehicles by "consider[ing] the
assignment and maintenance of safety as the highest priority,
recognizing the clear intent, encouragement, and dedication of Congress
to the furtherance of the highest degree of safety in motor carrier
transportation." 4 More specifically, the FMCSA is charged with enforcing
federal laws and regulations, particularly the Federal Motor Carrier
Safety Regulations (FMCSR). 5 The FMSCR is "applicable to all
employers, employees, and commercial motor vehicles that transport
property or passengers in interstate commerce." 6 However, the FMSCR
does not apply to the following: (1) school bus operations;
(2) "[t]ransportation performed by the Federal government, a State, or
any political subdivision of a State, or an agency established under a
compact between States that has been approved by the Congress of the
United States"; 7 (3) transportation of personal property not for
compensation; (4) transportation of corpses or sick and injured persons;
(5) fire trucks and other rescue vehicles while operating in an emergency
circumstance; (6) "[t]he operation of commercial motor vehicles designed
or used to transport between 9 and 15 persons (including the driver)"; 8
and (7) propane transporters if the FMCSR would prevent them from
responding to an emergency requiring immediate response. 9
In addition to complying with the FMSCR, commercial motor vehicle
operators must comply with state and local laws and regulations,
including obtaining and maintaining a commercial driver's license

2. The sixty-ninth volume of the Mercer Law Review marks the first survey of
commercial transportation law in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit. For that reason, this Article covers an expanded survey period.
3. Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-159, 113 Stat. 1748
(1999) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 113 (1999)).
4. 49 U.S.C. § 113 (2017).
5. 49 C.F.R. §§ 350-99 (2017).
6. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(a)(1) (2017).
7. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(2) (2017).
8. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f)(6) (2017).
9. 49 C.F.R. § 390.3(f) (2017).
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(CDL).10 Although issued by individual states, the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 199911 authorizes the FMCSA to regulate CDLs
nationwide. 12 Typically, there are three classes of CDLs: Class A, for
"[a]ny combination of vehicles with a gross combination weight rating
(GCWR) of 11,794 kilograms or more (26,001 pounds or more) provided
the GVWR of the vehicle(s) being towed is in excess of 4,536 kilograms
(10,000 pounds);"13 Class B, for "[a]ny single vehicle with a GVWR of
11,794 kilograms or more (26,001 pounds or more), or any such vehicle
towing a vehicle not in excess of 4,536 kilograms (10,000 pounds)
GVWR;"14 and Class C, for "[a]ny single vehicle, or combination of
vehicles, that meets neither the definition of Group A nor that of Group
B as contained in this section, but that either is designed to transport 16
or more passengers including the driver, or is used in the transportation
of hazardous materials." 15
A. Regulatory Developments
Since the inception of the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of
1999, commercial motor vehicle drivers regulated by the FMCSA have
been required to maintain hours of service (HOS) logbooks recording the
driver's duty status for each twenty-four-hour period.' 6 In the past,
commercial motor vehicle drivers had the option to record their HOS
manually using a specific handwritten grid.17 As of December 18, 2017,
however, motor carriers "operating commercial motor vehicles must
install and require each of its drivers to use an [electronic logging device
(ELD)] to record the driver's duty status."' 8 Although the overall
implications of this new regulation are unclear, there are two particular
areas of the law that will undoubtedly be affected by the FMCSA's new
ELD mandate. First, the requirement of using ELDs to log HOS should
improve the integrity of recording a driver's on-duty and off-duty hours.
Better tracking, in turn, should improve motor carriers' and law
enforcement's ability to spot HOS violations. Second, ELDs should help
prevent spoliation of evidence in litigation involving commercial motor
vehicles by eliminating a driver's or motor carrier's ability to destroy the

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

49 C.F.R.
49 U.S.C.
Id.
49 C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.
49 C.F.R.

§§ 383.3(a), 390.3(b)
§ 113 (2017).

(2017).

§ 383.91(a)(1) (2017).
§ 383.91(a)(2) (2017).
§ 383.91(a)(3) (2017).
§ 395.8(a)(1) (2017).
§ 395.8(a)(1)(iv)(C) (2017).
§ 395.8(a)(1)(i) (2017).
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paper logs before they can be saved in an electronic filing system.
Hopefully, this will reduce the number of issues arising in trucking
litigation and make for a more efficient litigation process.
In addition to the ELD mandate, the FMCSA has issued a final rule
heightening the minimum training requirements of new commercial
motor vehicle operators.19 These new regulations for training standards
apply to "individuals applying for their commercial driver's license (CDL)
for the first time; an upgrade of their CDL . .. or a hazardous materials
(H), passenger (P), or school bus (S) endorsement for the first time." 20 The
rule primarily revises the FMCSR's special training requirementS 21 to
require that entry-level drivers receive mandatory training. 22 The
regulation went into effect on June 5, 2017.23
Next, the FMCSA promulgated a final rule revising the medical
examination report that medical examiners of commercial motor vehicle
drivers must complete before issuing a medical examiner's certificate to
the drivers. 24 This final rule was issued on April 23, 2015, and went into
effect on April 20, 2016.25 The new forms required by the FMCSA do not
change the physical qualifications to be applied by a medical examiner,
but the new forms do seek more information from the medical examiner
and require more information to support their qualifying decisions,
especially where medical conditions exist. 26 The new forms will likely
lead to higher scrutiny of medical examiners that could result in more
failed medical examinations and more out-of-service drivers.
Finally, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
(NHTSA) is currently teaming with the FMCSA to make additions to
regulations affecting motor carriers and drivers. Most notably, the
NHTSA and the FMCSA proposed a new regulation to be added to the
FMCSR that would limit the speed of certain commercial motor

19. Minimum Training Requirements for Entry-Level Commercial Motor Vehicle
Operators, 81 Fed. Reg. 88732 (Dec. 8, 2016) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 380, 383 & 384).
20. Id.
21. 49 C.F.R. pt. 380.
22. 81 Fed. Reg. 88732.
23. Minimum Training Requirements for Entry-Level Commercial Motor Vehicle
Operators, 82 Fed. Reg. 23516 (May 23, 2017).
24. Medical Examiner's Certification Integration, 80 Fed. Reg. 22790 (Apr. 23, 2015)
(codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 383, 384 & 391); see also Guidance on Medical Examiner's
Certification Integration Final Rule Regarding Use of Driver, 80 Fed. Reg. 79273 (Dec. 21,
2015).
25. 80 Fed. Reg. 79273.
26. Id.
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vehicles. 27 The proposed regulation "would require vehicles with a gross
vehicle weight rating of more than 11,793.4 kilograms (26,000 pounds) to
be equipped with a speed limiting device initially set to a speed no greater
than a speed to be specified in a final rule." 28 This rule proposal has not

become final and is still under deliberation. 29 If instituted, the rule would
no doubt slow down tractor-trailer drivers and prevent many dangerous,
and often fatal, vehicle collisions.
B. JudicialDevelopments
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 31139,30 motor carriers transporting property
must have a minimum of $750,000 in insurance coverage for automobile
wrecks involving commercial motor vehicles. 3 ' In National Specialty
Insurance Co. v. Martin-Vegue,32 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eleventh Circuit examined whether an MCS-90 endorsement, which
guarantees the minimum level of coverage, applied in a case where the
at-fault tractor-trailer driver was excluded from coverage under the
motor carrier's insurance policy. 33 The case involved two motor carriers-

Freight and Transport-that allegedly were both the motor carriers "forhire" at the time of the wreck. 34 Evidence suggested that Freight had a
contract to carry the cargo contained in the trailer involved in the
collision and that Transport leased the tractor, trailer, and driver from
Freight. 35 Freight's insurance policy specifically excluded any driver who
was using one of Freight's covered vehicles under a "written lease or
trailer interchange agreement," such as the driver in this action. 36
The individual who brought the underlying personal injury action
argued here the MCS-90 endorsement applied to her claims and Freight

27. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations; Parts and Accessories Necessary for Safe Operation; Speed Limiting Devices,
81 Fed. Reg. 61942 (proposed Sept. 7, 2016) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 393, 571).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 49 U.S.C. § 31139 (2017).
31. 49 U.S.C. § 31139(b)(2) (2017). For commercial motor vehicles transporting
hazardous materials, the minimum insurance required by this Code section is $5 million.
49 U.S.C. § 31139(d)(2)(i) (2017).
32. 644 F. App'x 900 (11th Cir. 2016). This case was a declaratory judgment action
related to an underlying personal injury claim for the damages incurred due to a motor
vehicle collision. The defendant in this action was the plaintiff in the underlying personal
injury lawsuit.
33. Id. at 904.
34. Id. at 903-04.
35. Id. at 902, 906.
36. Id. at 904.
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was obligated to provide the minimum insurance limits despite the
exclusion in its insurance policy. The court disagreed, holding the
MCS-90 endorsement did not apply because Freight was not the
"for-hire" motor carrier.37 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that "[flederal
regulations define a for-hire motor carrier as a carrier in 'the business of
38
transporting, for compensation, the goods or property of another."' The
court determined that the driver of the tractor and trailer was hauling
the cargo on behalf of Transport, not Freight.3 9 Consequently, Transport
was the only motor carrier that could be considered the "for-hire" motor
carrier, and only Transport's-not Freight's-MCS-90 applied to the
collision. 40
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
denied a defendant's motion for summary judgment in a hit-and-run
involving a tractor-trailer where there was an eyewitness who could
identify the owner of the tractor-trailer from the company's display of its
logo on the side of the tractor-trailer.4 1 In Howze v. Western Express,
Inc., 42 the plaintiff was run off the road and injured by an unknown
tractor-trailer. 43 Fortunately for the injured motorcyclist, an eyewitness
to the incident testified that the at-fault tractor-trailer bore the words
"Western Express"-the same name as the defendant in the action.44 The
court determined that the eyewitness account was sufficient evidence for
a jury to determine that Western Express, Inc. "owned and operated" the
tractor-trailer. 45 This ruling is important because it provides a potential
avenue of recovery for plaintiffs in cases involving hit-and-runs by
tractor-trailer operators. Given the dangerous nature of tractor-trailers
and numerous injuries incurred across the country at the hands of their
operators, this decision may help ensure justice for victims of trucking
negligence regardless of whether the driver sticks around at the scene of
the incident.
Spoliation of drivers' logs created as part of a commercial motor vehicle
operator's duty-status requirement under the FMCSR is evolving in the
Eleventh Circuit. The United States District Court for the Middle

37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 907-08.
Id. (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 387.5).
Id.
Id.

41. Howze v. W. Express, Inc., No. 7:14-CV-01407-RDP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103935,

at *5, *28 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 8, 2016).
42. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103935.
43. Id. at *3.
44. Id. at *6.
45. Id. at *23-24.

2018]

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION

1093

District of Georgia recently sanctioned the defendants in a personal
injury case involving a tractor-trailer collision for failing to preserve the
tractor-trailer driver's HOS logs. 46 In O'Berry v. Turner,47 the commercial
motor carrier received a spoliation letter and notice of claims for the
personal injury of the plaintiffs just two months after the wreck. Despite
the spoliation letter, the motor carrier allegedly lost the driver's logs
when the company later moved its operations to a different building.
Although the motor carrier claimed an excuse for accidentally "losing"
the driver's logs after receiving notice of the claims,4 8 the court concluded
that the destruction of evidence was "intentional" and awarded sanctions
in the form of an adverse inference. 49 In other words, the court decided
that it would "instruct the jury that it must presume that the lost
information, including the driver's log and all other data that was
collected . . . was unfavorable to" the motor carrier.50 This ruling

demonstrates that a motor carrier must take the utmost care in
preserving relevant information regarding claims for personal injury,
especially the driver's logs that show a driver's hours of service.
III. AVIATION
Aviation law is an area highly regulated and determined by federal
regulations, 1 and in some cases, international treaties. 52 As a result,
federal courts determine much of the case law regulating commercial
aviation. 53 Moreover, recent updates and amendments to federal aviation

46. O'Berry v. Turner, 7:15-CV-00064-HL, 7:15-CV-00075-HL, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
55714, at *10 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2016).
47. 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55714 (M.D. Ga. Apr. 27, 2016).
48. Id. at *6-7.
49. Id. at*12.
50. Id. at *14.
51. ROBIN C. LARNER, 15 GA. JuR. PERSONAL INJURY AND TORTS § 29:25 (2017)
("Federal aviation regulations have been promulgated to regulate virtually every aspect of
aviation in the United States; these regulations are duly published in accordance with law
in the Code of Federal Regulations, and they have the force of law.").
52. The United Nations treaty regarding international carriage by air, the Montreal
Convention (which replaced its predecessor, the Warsaw Convention, Ugaz v. American
Airlines, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1360 (S.D. Fla. 2008)), sets forth uniform rules for
claims that arise out of incidents that occur during international air transportation. See
Marotte v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 296 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2002) ("[Tlhe Warsaw
Convention is the exclusive mechanism of recovery for personal injuries suffered on board
an aircraft or in the course of embarking or disembarking from an airplane." (citation
omitted)); Ugaz, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 1360 ("The Montreal Convention entered into force in
the United States on November 4, 2003 and superseded the Warsaw Convention.").
53. Indeed, state courts frequently look to federal aviation regulations when
addressing aviation-related issues under state law. See, e.g., Eagles Jets, LLC v. Atlanta
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statutes demonstrate the extent to which federal legislation and
regulation impact the landscape of commercial aviation law.5 4
A. Recent Cases
In the past two years, few cases have been decided that directly impact
commercial aviation, in large part due to the already extensive federal
regulation in that area. In Zamber v. American Airlines, Inc.,55 the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida had the
opportunity to address the interplay between Florida consumer
protection law and federal preemption of state attempts to regulate air
transportation.5 6 Specifically, in Zamber, the district court addressed a
motion to dismiss a purported class action brought under Florida state
laws for alleged deception and unjust enrichment regarding the language
appearing on an airline's website when a customer purchases optional
trip insurance.5 7 The case presented a threshold issue of whether the
federal Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)58 foreclosed or preempted the
plaintiffs claims.5 9
The plaintiff in Zamber alleged that, while the trip insurance was
being provided by a third-party insurer, defendant American Airlines,
Inc. (American) was receiving an undisclosed "kickback" on every trip
insurance policy sold to American's customers.60 The plaintiff alleged this
practice violated Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act
(FDUTPA) and constituted unjust enrichment. American moved to
dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs claims were preempted by
the ADA.61
The ADA preempts state laws that are "related to a price, route, or
service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation." 62 A state

Jet, Inc., 321 Ga. App. 386, 740 S.E.2d 439 (2013) (discussing whether the Certificate of
Aircraft Registration required by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) constitutes
ownership of the aircraft for purposes of a contract dispute); Sky King 101, LLC v.
Thurmond, 314 Ga. App. 377, 724 S.E.2d 412 (2012) (addressing FAA flight procedures and
regulations followed by pilots when analyzing whether defendant air transportation
company had "control" over a co-pilot sufficient to be considered his employer).
54. See FAA Extension, Safety, and Security Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-190, 130 Stat.
615 (discussed in text accompanying infra notes 80-83).
55. No. 16-23901, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49299 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2017).
56. Id. at *1-2.
57. Id. at *1.
58. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1) (2017).
59. Zamber, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49299, at *2.
60. Id. at *4.
61. Id. at *6-7.
62. 49 U.S.C. § 41713(b)(1).
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63
law is considered "related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier"
when it has "a connection with, or reference to, airline 'rates, routes, or
services."'6 4 "The Eleventh Circuit has explained that [the] ADA does not
'result in the preemption of virtually everything an airline does,' but
rather, the ADA's preemptive effect is 'limited to the bargained-for
65
aspects of airline operations over which carriers compete."'
The district court noted in Zamber that the case appeared to present
an issue of first impression as to whether the ADA preemption would
66
apply in the context of trip insurance sold by a third party. Ultimately,
the district court elected to postpone ruling on the ADA preemption issue
at the motion-to-dismiss phase, finding that discovery of additional
67
necessary facts was required.
While Zamber involved facts directly affecting the commercial aviation
industry, cases involving private, non-commercial aviation may
nevertheless shed light on how federal courts will analyze the interplay
between state law and federal regulations in the commercial context. In
Knous v. United States,6 8 the Eleventh Circuit considered a wrongful
death action in which the plaintiffs alleged the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) breached its duty of care in providing air traffic
control services to a pilot of a private aircraft, resulting in a plane crash
that killed the pilot and his wife.69 The plaintiffs brought their claims
under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 70 Following a bench trial, the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia concluded an
air traffic controller had no duty to report observed weather or provide
vectoring services to the pilot, and that he acted reasonably under the
circumstances. The district court also found that the weather did not
cause the in-flight breakup of the plane.7 1

63. Id.
64. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992).
65. Zamber, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49299, at *20 (quoting Branche v. Airtran Airways,
Inc., 342 F.3d 1248, 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis in original)); see also Amerijet
Int'l, Inc. v. Miami-Dade Cty., 627 F. App'x 744, 749 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a
"service" under the ADA "must fit within the limited range of services over which airlines
between an air
compete" and must be provided as part of a "bargained-for exchange ...
carrier and its consumers").
66. Zamber, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49299, at *19.
67. Id. at *19-20.
68. 683 F. App'x 859 (11th Cir. 2017).
69. Id. at 860.
70. 28 U.S.C. ch. 171 (2018).
71. Id.
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On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's findings. 72
In analyzing the duty of air traffic controllers, the Eleventh Circuit noted
that the duty may "rest either upon the requirements of procedures
manuals spelling out the functions of its air traffic controllers or upon
general pilot reliance on the government for a given service." 73
Referencing the FAA Air Traffic Control Manual (ATCM), the Eleventh
Circuit agreed with the district court that:
[T]he primary purpose of the air traffic controller system is to prevent
collision between aircraft and organize and expedite the flow of
traffic[;] [c]ontrollers are required to stay aware of current, pertinent
weather information and provide additional services, like weather
reporting, 'to the extent possible, contingent only upon higher priority
duties and other factors .

..

; [and controllers are required] to provide

pilots with pertinent information on observed/reported weather. 74

The district court concluded that the controller in Knous satisfied this
duty by communicating three "PIREPs" (pilot reports of actual weather
conditions encountered by a plane in flight) to the pilot prior to the
subject incident. The court determined that because the controller
subsequently prioritized separating planes and directing an FAA flight
check in his sector, rather than providing updated weather information
to the pilot, his conduct before was consistent with the controller's duty
of care.75 The Eleventh Circuit agreed.76 It also rejected the plaintiffs'
assertion that a 2006 FAA memorandum required the controller to relay
weather data depicted on his radar to pilots in the area, in addition to
PIREPs.7 7
Of particular relevance to future aviation cases involving alleged
negligence of air traffic controllers, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
argument that the ATCM established a "floor" on conduct, and that the
duty of reasonable care required additional acts by the controller.78
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit noted that, even if the controller had
breached a duty of care, it would nevertheless affirm the district court's
finding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate the weather proximately
caused the plane to break apart in flight.7 9

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 861.
at 863 (quoting Gill v. United States, 429 F.2d 1072, 1075 (5th Cir. 1970)).

at 863-64.
at 864.
at 864-65.
at 866-67.

COMMERCIAL TRANSPORTATION

2018]

1097

B. Legislation
Finally, on the legislative front, federal statutes pertaining to
commercial aviation were amended pursuant to the FAA Extension,
Safety, and Security Act of 2016,80 which was enacted on July 15, 2016.81
The stated purpose of the Act was to extend authorizations for the airport
improvement program, to amend the tax code to extend funding and
expenditure authority of the Airport and Airway Trust Fund, and for
other purposes. 82 The Act encompassed everything from mental health
screening for pilots, "laser pointer incidents," and aviation cybersecurity,
to extensive provisions related to "unmanned aircraft" (drones) and
refunds for delayed baggage. 83 Even a cursory review of the legislation
and affected statutes demonstrates the extensive influence federal
statutory law and the FAA exercise over legal developments in
commercial aviation.
IV. VEHICLES FOR HIRE: TAXICABS, LIMOUSINES,
AND RIDESHARE SERVICES

Regulation of taxicabs, limousines, and rideshare services (also known
as transportation network entities or transportation network
companies), such as Uber and Lyft, primarily occurs at the state and local
level. The federal courts primarily have been called upon to adjudicate
two issues: Whether service providers violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA)84 by classifying drivers as independent contractors and
whether new regulations distinguishing between rideshare services and
traditional taxicab and limousine services are constitutional.

A. FairLabor StandardsAct Litigation
Litigation over labor disputes between drivers and their employers
often arises in the context of traditional taxicab and limousine services.
85
For example, in Francoisv. Gulf Coast Transportation,Inc., two Florida
taxicab drivers filed suit against their former employer, alleging they and
their coworkers had been misclassified as independent contractors.
Drivers for Gulf Coast Transportation entered into twelve-month
"Agreement[s] for Independent Vehicle -For-Hire Operators," which

80. Pub. L. No. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615.
81. Id.; 49 U.S.C. §§ 40101-40130 (1994).
82. Pub. L. No. 114-190, 130 Stat. 615.
83. Id.
84. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1938).
85. No. 8:16-cv-1061-T24 TBM, slip op. 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77181 (M.D. Fla. May
22, 2017).
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allowed them to lease a taxicab for a set fee. The cabs came with a
certificate permitting operation in Hillsborough County, Florida, as well
as a radio dispatch system, a fare meter, and a computer for accepting
credit card payments. The agreements provided the drivers would keep
all the money they generated, but they were not paid any wages. The
agreements stated they were independent contractors; however, the
plaintiffs alleged they were actually employees, so failure to pay them a
wage violated the FLSA.86
In particular, the plaintiffs argued Gulf Coast Transportation
exercised significant control over their manner of work and gave them no
opportunity to make a profit because it suspended or reprimanded
drivers who refused to take fares from the dispatch system; it conducted
performance reviews and evaluations; it required drivers to take airport
passengers at the flat fees it negotiated rather than at the usual rate; it
fined or reprimanded drivers for failing to comply with policies and
procedures; it reserved the right to terminate unilaterally or to refuse to
renew a driver's agreement; it required drivers to accept fares only
through the dispatch system or when hailed on the street rather than
building their own client lists; and it mandated that drivers "could not
refuse transportation to unruly or troublesome passengers after picking
them up."8 7 Although the company disputed many of these assertions, the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found the
allegations and supporting evidence sufficient to survive summary
judgment and to create a need for a jury trial.8 8
FLSA disputes in the context of transportation network entities are
complicated by the inclusion of arbitration agreements in the various
contracts those drivers accept through their mobile devices. In
Richemond v. Uber Technologies, Inc.,89 the plaintiff argued that Uber
had misclassified him and other employees as independent contractors
and did not properly pay him for overtime hours, thus, violating the
FLSA. Uber argued Richemond was required to submit his claim to
arbitration, but Richemond argued in turn that the arbitration provisions
in the contracts violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and
were unenforceable. 90 The United States District Court for the Middle
District of Florida granted Uber's motion to compel arbitration.9 1

86.
87.
88.
Clerk's
89.
90.
91.

Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *8. The parties settled on the morning of trial. No. 8:16-cv-01061-SCB-TBM,
Minutes-General, Aug. 28, 2017.
263 F. Supp. 3d 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
Id. at 1314.
Id. at 1318.
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Importantly, the court noted that the arbitration agreement included a
"delegation provision" making even disputes over the enforceability of the
arbitration provision subject to arbitration. 92 Here, the question of
whether Richemond was an employee or an independent contractor was
not only the basis for Richemond's substantive claim, it also would
determine the threshold matter of whether the NLRA, which applies only
to "employees," rendered the arbitration agreement unenforceable. 93
While acknowledging that courts are not to "assume that the parties
agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is clear and unmistakable
evidence that they did so," 94 the court found Richemond clearly acceded
to the arbitration provisions because they were prominently marked, he
had time to review them, and they included opt-out clauses of which he
did not avail himself.95 Accordingly, the court determined that an
arbitrator would be responsible for determining the threshold question
of whether the arbitration clause was enforceable, including "whether
Richemond's relationship with Uber [wa]s that of an employee or an
6
independent contractor."9
Another Florida Uber driver brought a similar claim in Lamour v.
Uber Technologies, Inc.97 As in Francois, the plaintiff contended that
Uber misclassified him and other drivers as independent contractors
rather than employees, and he argued that several aspects of the drivers'
contracts were unenforceable, particularly the arbitration agreement
and the collective-action waiver it included. Uber again moved to compel
arbitration. Lamour argued that because he was really an employee, not
an independent contractor, the arbitration provision violated the NLRA,
and the delegation provision directing this threshold issue to arbitration
was not clear and unmistakable.98 Citing Richemond alongside cases
from other circuits, the magistrate judge determined that the delegation
clause was clear and unmistakable and that it required the parties to
submit the threshold issues to an arbitrator. 99 Moreover, even where the
NLRA applies, the Eleventh Circuit has found collective-action waivers
00
The
to be procedural rights that may be subjected to arbitration.1
magistrate judge found the arbitration provision's opt-out clause

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1317.
Id. at 1316.
Id. at 1316-17.
Id. at 1317-18.
No. 1:16-cv-21449, slip op., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29706 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 1, 2017).
Id. *9-11.
Id. at *32-33.
Id. at *27.
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especially significant.10 1 Some drivers took advantage of the opt-out
clause, and it did not appear to be "a ruse or ... purposely ineffective."10 2
The magistrate judge recommended granting the motion to compel
arbitration, and the district court subsequently adopted the magistrate
judge's Report and Recommendations. 103
Thus, at least where Uber drivers in this circuit fail to exercise their
right to opt out of the arbitration provisions in their contracts, it appears
that challenges to Uber's labor practices will continue to be decided in
secret arbitration proceedings rather than in open court.
B. Constitutionalityof Separate Regulatory Schemes for Rideshare
Services and TraditionalVehicle-for-Hire Services
As rideshare services have entered local markets in Georgia, Florida,
and Alabama over the past several years, legislators have been faced
with how or whether to regulate this new spin on vehicles-for-hire.
Existing taxi and limousine drivers have not always been pleased with
the results. Two cases from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida illustrate the (largely unsuccessful) court
challenges that traditional vehicle-for-hire companies have raised to
what they see as unfairly lenient treatment of the new transportation
network entities and a dilution of the market for taxi and limousine
services.

104

In VTS Transportation,Inc. v. Palm Beach County,10 5 three limousine
services sued over a Temporary Operating Agreement (TOA) between the
County and a subsidiary of Uber Technologies, Inc. This agreement
allowed Uber "to operate in Palm Beach County without complying with
the ordinance governing vehicle-for-hire services." The plaintiffs argued
that allowing Uber to operate subject only to the TOA's less onerous
requirements violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause of
the U.S. Constitution1 06 because the plaintiffs remained subject to all the
requirements of the original ordinance. 107 To succeed on their claim, the
limousine services had to show there was no rational basis for the County
to enact the TOA treating Uber differently from other vehicle -for-hire

101. Id. at *34.
102. Id. at *4.
103. Id. at *7; order dated Aug. 28, 2017.
104. For more on legislation enacted by the Georgia General Assembly to regulate
rideshare networks and the Georgia Supreme Court case deciding the constitutionality of
this legislation, see Lowry et al., Commercial Transportation,supranote 1.
105. 239 F. Supp. 3d 1350 (S.D. Fla. 2017).
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
107. VTS Transp., Inc., 239 F. Supp. 3d at 1352.
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services; that is, the TOA was not rationally related to some legitimate
government purpose. 108
The district court found two rational bases for the differences between
Uber's treatment under the TOA and limousine companies' treatment
under the original ordinance.109 First, the ordinance did not account for
new technological developments that were key to Uber's operations.110
The ordinance specified that non-taxi rides had to be reserved at least
thirty minutes in advance by a writing, email, fax, or telephone, which
would thwart the Uber subsidiary's goal of offering rides within five to
fifteen minutes of a request made via Uber's digital platform.'1 1 The TOA
did not contain any prearrangement requirement, and the court found it
"reads as a stop-gap measure meant to allow [the subsidiary] to continue
operating while [the County] 'reviewed its [vehicle for hire] regulations
as they pertain specifically to [transportation network companies]."'11 2 In
fact, the County later amended the vehicle-for-hire ordinance to remove
the thirty-minute requirement and to redefine "prearranged" as
including requests made via a digital platform.11 3 As to other
requirements omitted from the TOA, such as insurance, background
checks, knowledge of local geography and the English language, driver
IDs, limitations on hours spent driving, and vehicle inspections, the court
found these rationally related to differences between the two services,
and thus, to the government's interest in facilitating competition.114
Accordingly, the plaintiffs failed to state a claim for an Equal Protection
violation, and the TOA stood.115
Traditional taxicab operators likewise challenged the constitutionality
of an ordinance regulating transportation network entities in Miadeco
Corp. v. Miami-Dade County.116 Miami-Dade County required anyone
operating a for-hire vehicle to obtain a for-hire license, or "medallion,"
which was considered the driver's intangible property. The County
limited the total quantity of medallions, though it also occasionally
auctioned off new ones, and the medallions were eligible to be resold. In
May 2016, however, the County passed a new ordinance regulating only
transportation network entities, which did not require those drivers to

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1354.
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
Id.
113. Id. at 1355-56.
114. See id. at 1356-62.
115. Id. at 1362.
116. 249 F. Supp. 3d 1296, 1299 (S.D. Fla. 2017), appeal filed (Apr. 28, 2017).
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obtain medallions. Instead, the transportation network entity was
required to obtain a "preliminary transportation network entity license
or a transportation network entity for-hire license." There was no
limitation on the number of such licenses that could be issued. This
regulation also allegedly imposed looser requirements on rideshare
drivers with respect to insurance, vehicle inspections, fare charges, and
background checks than those imposed on taxicab drivers. The plaintiffs
alleged that the application of less onerous regulations to rideshare
networks violated taxi drivers' Equal Protection Rights and that allowing
rideshare drivers to operate without medallions, devalued the taxi
drivers' medallions, which violated the Fifth Amendment 17 so as to
constitute a taking.11 8
As in VTS Transportation,the district court found several "important
differences" between taxis and rideshare services that created a rational
basis for the separate regulatory system, including the manner in which
rides are hailed, the formation of a contract between rideshare drivers
and their customers through the smartphone app, and rideshare services'
variation in pricing versus taxi drivers' set fare rates. 119 As to the inversecondemnation claim, the court pointed out that taxi drivers' property
rights are in the medallions themselves, not in the overall for-hiretransportation market. 120 Indeed, while the law did create a property
interest in the taxi medallions, a takings claim cannot arise in an area
that is subject to such pervasive government control and into which the
individual entered voluntarily. 12 1 'Property' does not include a right to
be free from competition," 122 the County did not confiscate or negate the
medallions, there still existed a market for taxis, and the medallions
retained value, even if their secondary market value decreased. 123 Thus,
the taxi drivers failed to state a claim for either an Equal Protection
violation or a taking.1 24

117. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
118. Miadeco Corp., 249 F. Supp. 3d at 1300-01. The plaintiffs also alleged (and
subsequently abandoned) a claim for a Commerce Clause violation, but the court noted that
all of the activity at issue here was entirely intrastate. Id. at 1301, 1306-07.
119. Id. at 1304.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1305.
122. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 1305-06.
124. Id. at 1304, 1306.
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V. RAILROADS

"Railroads are among the most heavily regulated American
industries." 125 Several railroad-related regulations and judicial decisions
were issued during this survey period, mostly pertaining to railroad
safety.
A. Regulatory Developments
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) amended several
regulations in 49 C.F.R. Part 236126 in response to the Positive Train
Control Enforcement and Implementation Act of 2015,127 which extended
the deadline for the railroad industry to implement Positive Train
Control (PTC) systems on locomotives. 128 The new deadline for
implementation is December 31, 2018, with the opportunity for another
extension to December 31, 2020, and an additional three years for small
railroads. 129 When fully implemented, all "Class I railroad main lines
handling poisonous-inhalation-hazard materials and any railroad main
lines with regularly scheduled intercity and commuter rail passenger
service"1 30 will have PTC systems, which use "communicationbased/processor-based train control technology [to prevent] train-to-train
collisions, overspeed derailments, incursions into established work zone
limits, and the movement of a train through a main line switch in the
wrong position."1 31 Full implementation of PTC will be a significant step
forward in passenger and freight-rail safety.
The FRA enacted new regulations at 49 C.F.R. part 270132 on August
12, 2016, which finally went into effect on December 4, 2017.133 These
regulations require certain commuter and intercity passenger railroads
to develop and implement a System Safety Program (SSP), a program of
"processes and procedures [that] will identify then mitigate or eliminate
hazards and the resulting risks on the railroad's system." 134 "These
procedures, processes, and programs include, but are not limited to, the

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 174 (3d Cir. 2013).
49 C.F.R. pt. 236 (2017).
H.R. 3651, 114th Cong. (1st Sess. 2015).
Positive Train Control Systems, 81 Fed. Reg. 10126-27 (Feb. 29, 2016).
81 Fed. Reg. 10126.

130.

FEDERAL RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION,

POSITIVE TRAIN CONTROL,

https://www.

fra.dot.gov/ptc.
131. Id.
132. 49 C.F.R. pt. 270 (2017).
133. See System Safety Program, 81 Fed. Reg. 53850 (Aug. 12, 2016); System Safety
Program, 82 Fed. Reg. 26359 (June 7, 2017).
134. 81 Fed. Reg. 53850; see 49 C.F.R. § 270.101.
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following: A maintenance, inspection, and repair program; rules
compliance and procedures review(s); SSP employee/contractor training;
and a public safety outreach program."1 35 Of particular importance to
lawyers, these regulations restrict the ability of litigants and the public
to obtain some information about the SSPs:
[Information that is generated solely for the purpose of developing,
implementing, or evaluating a[n] SSP is protected from (1) discovery,
or admissibility into evidence, or use for other purposes in a proceeding
for damages involving personal injury, wrongful death, or property
damage, and (2) State discovery rules and sunshine laws which could
be used to require the disclosure of such information. Information that
is compiled or collected for a purpose unrelated to the railroad's SSP
is not protected.1 36
The FRA also opined that risk reduction records in the
Administration's possession generally will be exempt from mandatory
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)137 due to the
interest in protecting the confidentiality of the SSP development and
implementation process.13 8
Finally, for matters within the jurisdiction of the Surface
Transportation Board, that agency enacted several amendments to its
arbitration provisions in 49 C.F.R. part 1108.139
B. Recent Cases
The Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA)140 expressly preempts most
state and local laws.141 In this survey period, this fact was illustrated in
Phillips v. OmniTRAX, Inc.1 42 The plaintiff brought various state law
claims against Georgia Florida Railway, LLC, alleging it had not
properly maintained and inspected the automatic warning gates at a
particular rail crossing, causing the gates to strike the plaintiffs truck.1 43
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia noted
135. 81 Fed. Reg. 53851; see 49 C.F.R. § 270.103.
136. 81 Fed. Reg. 53851; see 49 C.F.R. § 270.105.
137. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (2017).
138. 81 Fed. Reg. 53851.
139. 49 C.F.R. pt. 1108 (2017); Revisions to Arbitration Procedures, 81 Fed. Reg. 69410
(Oct. 6, 2016).
140. 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-20121 (2017).
141. 49 U.S.C. § 20106(a)(2).
142. No. 1:14-cv-135, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135329 (M.D. Ga. 2016).
143. Id. at *1. The first-named defendant, OmniTRAX, Inc., was dismissed without
objection from the plaintiff upon a determination that it was not a proper party to the suit.
Id. at *2.
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that the FRSA gives the U.S. Secretary of Transportation authority to
regulate "every area of railroad safety" and that the express preemption
clause prohibits state governments from making their own regulations if
the Department of Transportation has issued a regulation covering the
same subject matter. 144 In this case, the court found both Georgia's
common law regarding the duty to maintain active warning devices and
the relevant statutes, O.C.G.A. §§ 32-6-190145 and 32-6-200,146 had been
subsumed by the set of federal regulations governing the maintenance
147
The
and safety of highway-rail grade crossing warning systems.
law
state
his
and
pursue
plaintiff could only avoid federal preemption
eliminate
to
is
necessary
claims if he could show that the state law "'(1)
or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible with
a [federal] law, regulation, or order .
148

.

. and (3) does not unreasonably

As the plaintiff could not show the
burden interstate commerce."'
conditions at that particular crossing were unique and incapable of being
adequately addressed by national standards, his claims against the
railway were barred.149
In Johns v. CSX Transportation,Inc., 150 on the other hand, the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia reviewed claims
under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-190 on the merits, as well as considering other
claims under the Georgia Code of Public Transportation (GCPT) and
federal law claims. 15 1 Johns was catastrophically injured when he was
traveling north on Anderson Memorial Church Road in Fitzgerald,
Georgia and a train collided with his truck as he crossed the railroad
tracks. 152 Johns's wife brought various state and federal claims on his
behalf. 153 As to her claims under O.C.G.A. § 32-6-190 and the common
law for failure to install active warning devices and failure to widen the
road, the court did not mention possible preemption by federal
regulations. 154 Instead, it found no common law duties existed, and the
respective statutory duties fell on the Georgia Department of
Transportation and the county. 15 5 The court likewise found no duty under
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. at *9.
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-190 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 32-6-200 (2017).
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135329, at *9-10.
Id. at *11 (quoting 49 C.F.R. § 20106).
Id.
210 F. Supp. 3d 1357 (M.D. Ga. 2016).
Id. at 1369, 1378.
Id. at 1363-64.
Id. at 1367.
Id. at 1369-71.
Id. at 1370 n.6, 1371.
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the GCPT to install a crossbuck on the same post as the existing stop sign
or to notify any governmental entity of the allegedly dangerous
conditions evidenced by the past history of collisions at the subject
location.156

The district court did address federal preemption with respect to train
speeds.15 7 The plaintiff alleged the operator negligently drove the train
at a speed in excess of the fifteen miles per hour specified in its internal
rule, but the court noted the FRSA preempted common law claims for
operating at excessive speeds unless the speed violated an internal rule
that was created pursuant to a federal regulation or order.1568 Here, the
applicable federal regulation allowed speeds up to sixty miles per hour,
and the internal rule specifying a lower speed was not created pursuant
60
to a federal regulation or order. 59 Thus, the claim was preempted.o
The most consequential case pertaining to railroads in this survey
period, however, has nothing to do with preemption or safety. BNSF
Railway Co. v. Tyrrell'6 addressed the state courts' jurisdiction over
railroads under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA).16 2 Two
suits were brought against BNSF under FELA, which makes railroads
liable to their employees for money damages for on-the-job injuries. Both
suits were brought in Montana, although neither worker resided nor was
injured in Montana. 163 The Montana Supreme Court first held the state
courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over BNSF under 45 U.S.C. §
56,164 which the Supreme Court of the United States determined was not
a personal jurisdiction provision; rather, it addressed venue and subject
matter jurisdiction. 65
The Montana Supreme Court held in the alternative that personal
jurisdiction could be based on Montana's long-arm statute, which applied
to all "persons found within Montana." BNSF did not contest that it was

156. Id. at 1372-73.
157. Id. at 1373.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1373-74. The train operator was traveling at thirty-nine miles per hour at
the time of the collision. Id. at 1373.
160. Id. at 1374. The plaintiff also alleged failure to keep a proper lookout, failure to
control excess vegetation at the crossing, and failure to comply with federal horn
regulations. Id. at 1374, 1377-78. The court ultimately disposed of each of these claims by
finding the alleged conduct was not a proximate cause of Johns's injuries and his
contributory negligence was the sole proximate cause. See id. at 1380.
161. 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).
162. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60; BNSFRy. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1551.
163. BNSFRy. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1551.
164. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (2017).
165. BNSF Ry. Co., 137 S. Ct. at 1551-52.
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"found within" Montana within the meaning of the state law. It was not
incorporated in Montana and did not maintain its principal place of
business there, but it did maintain over 2,000 miles of railroad track in
Montana and have more than 2,000 employees there.16 6 The issue before
the Supreme Court of the United States, then, was whether Montana's
long-arm statute comported with due process.167 The Court held no
specific jurisdiction existed because neither worker was injured from
work in or related to Montana.168 As to general jurisdiction, which
requires such continuous and systematic contacts in the forum as to
render the company "at home" there, the Court held the "magnitude" of
BNSF's activities in Montana was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction. 69
The general jurisdiction inquiry "calls for an appraisal of a corporation's
activities in their entirety, [and] a corporation that operates in many
places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them."1 70 Here, the Court

determined that BNSF's contacts with Montana were sufficient to confer
jurisdiction only over claims related to the business it conducts there.171
Although BNSF arose in the context of railroad operations and FELA,
its holding is not limited to rail cases. BNSF and another recent personal
jurisdiction case, Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of
California, San Francisco County,1 72 already are having ripple effects
throughout the country on existing jury verdicts and on plaintiffs' ability
to bring their claims in their choice of forum. 173
Finally, readers with an interest in taxation should note the recent
decision CSX Transportation,Inc. v. Alabama Departmentof Revenue,174
which found that Alabama's scheme did not discriminate against
railroads in violation of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory
Reform Act of 1976175 by exempting motor carriers and water carriers
from a diesel fuel sales tax imposed on railroads.176

166. Id. at 1558-59.
167. Id. at 1555.
168. Id. at 1558.
169. Id. at 1559.
170. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
171. Id.
172. 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).
173. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Missouri Appeals Court Reverses $72M Talc Verdict,
NAT'L L.J. (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.law.com/nationallawjournal/sites/nationallaw
journal/20 1 7/10/17/missouri-appeals-court-reverses-72m-talc-verdict/.
174. 247 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (N.D. Ala. 2017), appeal filed (Apr. 14, 2017).
175. Pub. L. No. 94-210, 90 Stat. 31 (1976).
176. CSX Transp. Inc., 247 F. Supp. 3d at 1242.
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VI. CONCLUSION

As this Article illustrates, commercial transportation law involves an
often-complex interaction of state and federal law, even in areas that are
primarily regulated at the federal level. Efforts to adapt the law to the
fast-changing business and technological landscape further complicate
this picture. Successfully navigating issues in commercial transportation
requires a thorough understanding of laws and regulations at both the
federal and state level and how they interact with each other.

